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I. INTRODUCTION 
Western law has historically granted more limited rights to the 
owners of intangible1 works of authorship and invention than it has 
granted to the owners of tangible objects. This makes functional 
sense. Exclusion rights over intangibles can impose more costs on 
the public than can exclusion rights over tangibles.2 Works of 
* Copyright 2002 by Wendy J. Gordon. Thanks to Camila Alarcon, Jean 
Camp, John Cioffi, Tyler Cowen, Tim Cullen, Robert Denicola, Andrew 
Dougherty, Scott Keiff, Gary Lawson, Doug Lichtman, Joe Liu, Mike Meurer, 
Fred Moses, Ray Patterson, Malia Pollack, Richard Posner, Mark Rose, Alicia 
Ryan, Art Spitzer, David Vaver, Larry Yackle, Fred Yen, and especially Jane 
Ginsburg and Stan Liebowitz for helpful suggestions and critique. Thanks also 
to Tamar Frankel and Larry Lessig for the discussions that first prompted me 
to make some of the points presented here. 
Needless to say, not all these friends and colleagues would agree with 
what I say here. I am solely responsible for the views presented. 
1. Inventions and works of authorship are "intangible" in the sense that 
they can be recreated even if they have no existence except in the mind. Thus, 
in Ray Bradbury's classic, FAHRENHEIT 451 (40th anniversary ed. 1993), 
book-lovers in a book-burning society could survive by memorizing the intan-
gible arrangement of words that made up a given text. 
Federal copyright applies only when an intangible is "fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression" (that is, when the intangible arrangement is written 
down, filmed, recorded, painted, or otherwise embodied in a physical object). 
17 U.S.C. § 1 02(a) (2000). The fixation requirement provides boundaries, ad-
heres to the constitutional grant that limits Congress's copyright powers to 
"Writings," see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, and serves evidentiary purposes. 
See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, Duke L.J. (forthcom-
ing, 2003). Nevertheless, copyright law recognizes a continuing distinction 
between the intangible work of authorship, and the copy or phonorecord in 
which the work of authorship is embodied. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 202 (owner-
ship of copyright as distinct from ownership of material object.) 
2. Tangible items can, at least in theory, be produced via perfect competi-
tion, where price can equal marginal cost, marginal cost can equal average 
cost, and a hefty consumer surplus results. By contrast, intangibles that 
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authorship and invention are capable of giving benefits inexhaustibly 
when shared, 3 and in a world filled with transaction costs, exclusion 
involve a high initial investment might not be produced if price equaled mar-
ginal cost, because for a copyist the marginal cost includes only the cost of 
physically duplicating and distributing an additional embodiment. Exclusivity 
allows the proprietor to charge a price above marginal cost, and thus poten-
tially cover her average cost including the initial cost of creation. Unfortu-
nately, another result of exclusivity is that fewer copies are made available, 
and consumer surplus is reduced, as compared with what would have occurred 
if incentives were not a problem or were provided by other means. See Harold 
Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, J.L. & ECON., Apr. 1970, at 
302 (discussing the economics of private and public goods); William M. Lan-
des & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 325, 328 (1989) (without copyright protection the market price 
of a book might be bid down to the marginal cost of copying, resulting in the 
author and publisher failing to recover their costs of creating the work). 
Under copyright, many consumers who value the work above its marginal 
cost, and who are able and willing to pay a price at or above marginal cost, will 
be unable to purchase copies. See id. Similarly, many artists who value adapt-
ing and interpreting a prior work at or above the marginal cost of such adapta-
tion, and who are able and willing to pay a price at or above its marginal cost, 
will be unable to purchase the licenses that copyright requires. 
This reduced ability to consume or adapt is not necessarily a social loss: if 
the initial intangible could not have been created but for the lure of monopoly 
pricing, then the .potential consumers and adapters are not necessarily worse 
off in a world with copyright than they would have been in a world lacking 
both copyright and the works it calls forth. See discussion infra Part IV. But if 
copyright is longer or broader than it needs to be in order to induce a work, 
then the deadweight loss is clear. (In addition, even as to works called forth by 
the incentive of copyright, copyright can cause harm: there are many ways in 
which intellectual property can make some consumers and second-generation 
artists worse off than they would have been in a world where neither copyright 
nor the desired work existed. See the examples collected in Wendy J. Gordon, 
A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural 
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1555-59, 1567-70, 1583-
1605 ( 1993) [hereinafter Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression].) 
3. Compare, for example, the familiar image of a "tragic common": when 
every family in a village can graze its cows on the same field, but can indi-
vidually keep the profits from the resulting milk and meat, they may put so 
many cows on the common that the cows trample the grass to mud. See 
THOMAS SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 110-15, 216-17, 
231 (1978); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 
1968, at 1244-45. For an intangible like a song, by contrast, even the worst set 
of off-key singers cannot destroy the song. 
Admittedly, even for intangibles there might be some problems of conges-
tion. However, for intangibles, the far worse dangers are those that propertiza-
tion poses: in particular, the possibility that too many claimants will exist, in-
hibiting each other's ability to use the resource. This has become known as the 
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rights hamper sharing. The Constitution's Copyright and Patent 
Clause is explicit both in recognizing that copyrights and patents 
must serve the public benefit, and in articulating a primary tool 
needed to serve that goal: limits on duration.4 When an intellectual 
property term expires, the competition that results reduces the price 
of copying and adaptation, and expands both the purchase of copies 
and creative use of the work. 5 The durational limit lies at the center 
of Eldred v. Ashcroft and the instant Symposium. 6 
tragic anticommons. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 
SCIENCE, May I, 1998, at 698-70 I, available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/search.dtl. 
4. "The Congress shall have Power To ... promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For further explanation, see the immediately following note, 
and discussion infra Part IV. 
"For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil," said Lord Macaulay 
of copyright, "But the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for 
the purpose of securing the good." Thomas Macaulay, Speech Before the 
House of Commons (Feb. 5, I84I), in 8 THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 
203-04 (Lady Trevelyan ed., I906) [hereinafter Macaulay Speech of 184I ], 
available at http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2002/4/2511345/03329. 
5. As mentioned, exclusive rights are an awkward mode of inducing the 
creative persons to produce intangibles. That is because intangibles are inex-
haustible, and exclusivity artificially limits sharing. Even in the abstract, there 
is no way to both provide an inexhaustible intangible and simultaneously pro-
duce a quantity of copies that is equal to what would be available under perfect 
competition--except (I) by using perfect price discrimination, see Demsetz, 
supra note 2, or (2) under circumstances where incentives are otherwise avail-
able from the start, or (3) when, under the protection of a intellectual-property 
monopoly, the revenues so exceed initial startup costs that, at some point, 
profit covers the startup cost (even multiplied by risk taken), and the special 
monopoly can cease. 
The first option, perfect price discrimination, would indeed disseminate a 
copy, or a permission, to everyone who values the copy or permission at or 
above marginal cost. However, perfect price discrimination accomplishes this 
trick by eliminating consumer surplus. See Demsetz, supra note 2 at 306. So 
even if the option were available-which in practice it is not-we might doubt 
its desirability. 
The second option rests on the possibility that for some works, copyright is 
unnecessary. For example, an author's internal drive to express herself or an 
inventor's scientific curiosity may bring some works forth. Similarly, the goal 
of achieving academic tenure may call some writings and inventions into be-
ing. As another example, a patron or governmental agency might subsidize 
creativity and inventive activity. When such conditions are present, perfect 
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The plaintiffs in Eldred attack Congress's most recent extension 
of the copyright term-the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act of 1998 (CTEA).7 In particular, plaintiffs question Congress's 
decision to add an extra twenty years to the already long copyright 
terms possessed by works already in existence when the CTEA was 
passed. This Article makes three contributions to the debate on the 
retrospectively applied term extension. 
First, the Article clarifies the issue of the CTEA's retrospective 
application. As the Article makes clear, to declare the CTEA invalid 
would not call into question all previous legislation in which Con-
gress extended existing works' copyright terms. Extending copy-
right in existing works is not in itself constitutionally infirm. 8 The 
Constitution would seem to be satisfied so long as the retrospective 
portion of the law provides some real assistance to creativity. The 
problem is that the CTEA provides none. 
By way of contrast, consider copyright law as it existed prior to 
1978. The writings of authors were protected by state copyright so 
competition may produce the optimal number of copies and adaptations with-
out loss of incentive. 
(The reader may wonder why I have omitted important factors such as 
lead-time advantage from this second category. Devices such as lead time, 
reputation, or a superior distributional system may indeed be sufficient to deter 
copying and generate high revenues. However, these devices provide incen-
tives by creating temporary monopolies, and with them deadweight loss. They 
therefore are not examples of perfect competition, but rather of monopolies 
produced by self-help. They may pose different administrative costs than 
copyright law does, but they are not free of deadweight loss.) 
The third option, ending the monopoly when most of its incentive benefits 
have been given, is the one the Constitution most explicitly adopts. It limits 
duration. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also discussion infra Part IV. 
6. Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (U.S. oral argument Oct. 9, 2002). 
7. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. I 05-298, 
I 12 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2), 
301(c), 302, 303, 304 (2000)). Before the CTEA, the copyright in ordinary 
works lasted through the life of the author and beyond it for another fifty years, 
and the copyright in published "works for hire" lasted for seventy-five years 
after publication. Under the CTEA, copyright in ordinary works lasts for sev-
enty years after the author's death, and copyright in published "works for hire" 
have a duration of ninety-five years after publication. 
8. The instant Article argues that not all retrospective grants of copyright 
are invalid. Some are justifiable, for example, as a mode of promise-keeping 
that increases incentives to creative activity. My contention is that the CTEA 
is not justifiable in this way. See discussion infra Part liLA. Nor does it seem 
justifiable in any other way. 
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long as they were unpublished, and federal law attached only when 
these pre-existing works were published with proper federal copy-
right notice. That was a form of retrospective grant: already-
existing works received federal copyright. But there was nothing 
unconstitutional about it. For Congress to promise that federal copy-
right would attach at the moment when state copyright would be lost 
gave authors a safeguard that encouraged them to create in the first 
instance.9 That federal grant was a form of promise-keeping to au-
thors: create your work and when it is published, federal law will 
protect it. Incentives for creativity were thereby provided. 
Similarly, there would be no constitutional defect in extending 
the copyright of existing works in circumstances that provide signifi-
cant encouragement to authorial activity. For example, authors may 
need assurance that the United States will remain sufficiently consis-
tent with its trading partners that our authors can anticipate receiving 
recognition of their rights abroad. 
However, the CTEA's retrospective extension does none of 
these things. It does not preserve authorial expectations. 10 It does 
not encourage creativity. 11 And neither the retrospective nor 
9. The rule that allowed federal copyright to attach at publication assured 
authors that when they circulated their work to the public-when it would be 
the most vulnerable to copying by strangers-federal law would prevent the 
free riding. 
The Copyright Act of 1976 changed the effect of publication. Under the 
1976 Act, federal copyright attaches as soon as an author fixes a creative work 
of authorship in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
The effective date of the 1976 Act was January I, 1978. 
Even prior to the 1976 Act, some unpublished works could be federally 
protected, so that the distinction between unpublished and published works 
was not always crucial. Nevertheless, in 1978 the line between unpublished 
and published works became immensely less important than it had been. 
10. See discussion infra Part liLA. 
11 . See discussion infra Part liLA-B. This Article defines "creative" activ-
ity as the kind of activity that gives rise to its own copyright. It can include 
selection, arrangement, the use of aesthetic judgment, and so on. Creativity in 
copyright is not a high standard, but some threshold test of creativity is inher-
ent in the constitutional term, "Authors," U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8, and in 
the statutory term, "original work of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). See, 
e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1991). 
Conversely, this Article defines "uncreative" or "noncreative" activity as effort 
that would not itself support a copyright. 
Someone pursuing a creative activity-for example, someone who restores 
an old film and adds something creative to it-has legal protection from 
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prospective term extensions make our law consistent with that of 
other nations. 12 At most, the retrospective extension may respond to 
a "public goods" characteristic in certain non-creative activities like 
film restoration. But not all "public goods" are the proper province 
of copyright. 
A "public good" is a good that can be shared non-rivalrously by 
many, and from whose use non-payors are not easily physically ex-
cluded. Goods with these characteristics are susceptible to free rid-
ing, and thus difficult to produce in a normal competitive market. 
Inventions and works of authorship are "public goods" whose crea-
tion is stimulated by the limited private exclusion rights known as 
patent and copyright. 13 Lighthouses and public defense are "public 
goods" for which governments usually provide direct support. 
Recent copying technology has brought something of a "public 
goods" character to many products that result from merely physical 
and non-creative effort. For example, it is now possible for a 
stranger to copy (and free ride on) film stock that has been restored, 
or books that have been digitized and posted on a Web site. 
However, the appearance of a "public good" does not mean that 
granting or extending federal copyright is the appropriate response, 
copying without any need for the CTEA retrospective grant: the moment the 
creative restoration is fixed in tangible media, a new federal copyright arises. 
It is someone pursuing a "noncreative" activity-for example, a noncreative 
restorer-who can profit from the CTEA's retrospective grant: only by piggy-
backing on the original copyright can he obtain legal protection from copying. 
See discussion infra Part III.D. 
12. See Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618, at 16-19 (the CTEA does 
not harmonize our law with Europe's, and in some ways increases discrepan-
cies between United States' and foreign regimes). 
13. This is discussed further infra Part II. Intellectual property law can be 
seen as an effort to cure a form of market failure stemming from the fact that 
intangibles, once circulated, are hard to fence off from nonpurchasers. Such 
third parties can copy the intangible, and resell it in competition with the origi-
nator. "Public goods" like military defense similarly cannot easily be withheld 
from non-payors, and they too are inexhaustible over a large range of use. In-
tangibles are therefore said to have "public goods" characteristics. See Wendy 
J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1610-11 
(1982) [hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure] and sources cited 
therein. 
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any more than the presence of a "public good" makes appropriate the 
kind of federal subsidy that the nation's army receives. 14 
The Article contends that encouraging noncreative activity such 
as restoration and digital dissemination is not among the purposes 
that the Framers would have envisaged when they adopted the Copy-
right Clause. 15 Undoubtedly, the Framers valued dissemination. 
However, so long as creative persons and their assignees were pro-
tected from copying, in the eighteenth century the physical aspect of 
publishing could take care of itself. 16 
This distinction is important. The District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals apparently placed significant weight on the possi-
bility that the CTEA would encourage noncreative physical activity 
including film preservation. 17 
Many amici and scholars have argued that activities such as film 
restoration and preservation are more likely to be hurt than helped by 
the CTEA. 18 I agree. Nevertheless, the burden of my argument here 
14. Most important here is the limited nature of federal powers. The Con-
stitution allows Congress to provide for the national defense, but not to provide 
any and all public goods at federal expense. Some such goods fall outside 
congressional mandate, and can only be provided by state and local govern-
ments. Similarly, the federal copyright power is limited. Congress can pro-
vide limited-time rights to authors and inventors, but not to any and all persons 
who may have produced something with "public goods" characteristics. See 
discussion infra Part II. 
15. See discussion infra Part II. 
16. See discussion infra Part II, notes 35-39,46-50 and accompanying text. 
17. The Circuit Court of Appeals wrote: 
The Congress found that extending the duration of copyrights on exist-
ing works would, among other things, give copyright holders an incen-
tive to preserve older works, particularly motion pictures in need of 
restoration. If called upon to do so, therefore, we might well hold that 
the application of the CTEA to subsisting copyrights is "plainly 
adapted" and "appropriate" to "promot[ing] progress." 
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 
All this talk of film restoration should not obscure the likely real benefici-
aries of the CTEA: owners of copyright in works whose investments have 
long been repaid, whom the CTEA will not encourage to engage in significant 
new work of restoration, and who will use the CTEA to seize what would oth-
erwise have been consumer surplus for themselves. 
18. See, e.g., Brief of Hal Roach Studios & Michael Agee as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 2-3, 14, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [hereinafter 
Hal Roach Brief]. The problems here involve, e.g., transaction costs (locating 
the owner of copyright in a long-ago created work can be difficult if not im-
possible), strategic behavior, and "anticommons" difficulties (when many 
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is different. I here suggest that (a) even if the retrospective portion 
of the CTEA contributes to solving a public goods problem faced by 
some persons interested in doing noncreative film restoration and 
dissemination (b) more than it adds to the transaction cost and anti-
commons problems faced by other film restorers and dissemina-
tors, 19 (c) the CTEA provision nevertheless can be invalidated be-
cause the Constitution permits a strong distinction to be made be-
tween uncreative physical activity and creative mental activity.2° 
Because the instant retrospective term extension has only nega-
tive effects on creativity, the distinction between creative mental ac-
tivity and uncreative physical activity helps clarify the constitutional 
defects of this particular retrospective term extension. For prospec-
tive term extension as well, the distinction may relieve the Court of 
the need to parse certain empirical claims. 
Second, this Article stresses that the CTEA's negative effects on 
creativity are not just a matter of authors having to pay more when 
they want to adapt prior generations' copyrighted materials. The 
more pernicious evil is that term extension may prevent "diverse and 
antagonistic"21 voices from creating exactly the works we most need 
parties have claim rights, a resource may end up unused because of difficulties 
coordinating the claimants). To illustrate the latter: to make copies or to per-
form an old movie whose copyright assignments have been returned to heirs 
via the termination right (see 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304), a restorer or disseminator 
would either need to wait until copyright expired, or would need to obtain li-
censes from (among others) the owner of copyright in any underlying book or 
story on which the movie was based, the owner of copyright in any independ-
ently created musical works used in the movie (e.g., hit songs played in the 
background), the owner of copyright in any independently created vocal per-
formances embedded in the musical soundtrack (e.g., the sound recordings of 
hit songs played in the background), and the owner of copyright in the cinema-
tography. There may be an independently created screenplay and other crea-
tive works that are separately owned as well. 
19. See the immediately preceding note. 
20. See discussion infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. In addition to 
the distinction between physical and mental labor, well captured in the term 
"intellectual property," the United States Supreme Court has also made a sharp 
distinction between creative and noncreative mental labor. The products of the 
former are protectable by federal copyright, while the products of the latter are 
not. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991 ). 
21. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 192 (1997), quoting 
with approval from Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 
(1994) (quoting United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 
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them to create. The Article borrows from literature on the creative 
process to argue that copyright extension could erode the creative 
community's ability to renew itself.22 
Third, the Article tries to make vivid some familiar economic 
arguments. After some point in duration, copyright suppresses more 
communicative activity than it calls forth23-and an extension such 
as the CTEA is likely to suppress speech without calling forth any 
new speech at all. 24 The Article also reminds the reader that the dry 
language of economics is talking about more than impact on Gross 
National Product: when an economist talks of "higher costs and 
lower production of new creative works, "25 he is necessarily address-
ing not only a loss of dollars and cents, but also a diminution of hu-
man abilities to process their experience through art. 
This Article does not argue for a particular level of scrutiny. 
Rather, it assumes that the Court will find the First Amendment ap-
plicable, and that some level of significant scrutiny will be applied. 
The goal of this Article is simply to offer a set of observations that 
may be useful to the Court at whatever analytic level it chooses to 
employ. 
This Introduction ends with a quotation from Samuel Johnson, 
who succinctly sounds the basic themes: 
(1972) (plurality opinion), (quoting from Associated Press v. United States, 
326 u.s. 1' 20 (1945)). 
22. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
23. This raises an argument analogous to that of Ian Ayres & Paul Klem-
perer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incen-
tives: The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999). They write: 
Legal scholars have failed to appreciate that unconstrained monopoly 
pricing is not a cost-justified means of rewarding patentees. The last 
bit of monopoly pricing produces large amounts of dead-weight loss 
for a relatively small amount of patentee profit. If society wants to use 
patent profits to induce innovation, it should choose the method of 
producing a particular level of profit that produces the least cost to 
society. But allowing patentees to raise price all the way to the mo-
nopoly level is a little like giving them a license to steal car radios-it 
produces a social cost (to car owners) far greater than the private bene-
fit. 
!d. at 987 (emphasis added). 
24. See discussion infra Parts III.C-D., IV, and Conclusion. 
25. Brief of George A. Ackerlof et a!. as Amici Curiae in support of Peti-
tioners at 12, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [hereinafter Economists' Brief]. 
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(A] certain degree of reputation is acquired merely by ap-
proving the works of genius, and testifying a regard to the 
memory of authors ... and therefore to ensure a participa-
tion of fame with a celebrated poet, many, who would, per-
haps, have contributed to starve him when alive, have 
heaped expensive pageants upon his grave. 26 
Johnson's purpose in penning these words was ostensibly not to 
condemn those who would "starve" authors (although Johnson un-
doubtedly did condemn them),27 but rather to call attention to a theat-
rical benefit for John Milton's granddaughter.28 The quoted lan-
guage contains two features well worth noting in the context of El-
dred. 
First, the passage suggests that posthumous honors may be too 
easy. The "illustrious dead"29 would have benefited more from sup-
port while they were alive and struggling. In our own era, federal 
and local governments have many options for providing aid to 
authors that would be more effective than copyright term 
extensions-but intellectual property legislation has almost a life of 
its own.30 
26 . So wrote Samuel Johnson in the General Advertiser of 1750. From the 
1750 entry in James Boswell's Life of Johnson, edited from the two-volume 
Oxford edition of 1904 by Jack Lynch, available at http://newark.rutgers.edu/ 
~jlynch/Texts/BLJ/blj50.html [hereinafter Boswell's Life of Johnson]. 
27. See id. Johnson initially became a writer by necessity, not by choice, 
and in early days often found himself in poverty despite writing as much as he 
could. 
28. Johnson's primary purpose in writing this passage was to encourage 
attendance at the benefit performance at Drury Lane Theater for which he had 
written a prologue. The benefit aimed to provide money for the apparently 
impoverished and elderly granddaughter of poet John Milton. See id. Inciden-
tally, retrospective term extension would not have helped the granddaughter: 
Milton had already sold his copyright, and English law apparently had no pro-
vision that allowed for a copyright's recapture by heirs. See Macaulay Speech 
of 1841, supra note 4, at 203-04. 
That Johnson, in the process of encouraging attendance, poked a bit of 
nasty fun at those who sought to polish their own reputations by attending is (I 
think) a characteristic Johnsonian touch. 
29. See id. 
30. See David Vaver, Intellectual Property: The State of the Art, 116 LAw 
Q. REv. 621, 636 (2000) ("The recent expansion of intellectual property has 
come to be more an end in itself than a means to the end of stimulating desir-
able innovation."). 
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Second, please note the source from which the passage from 
Johnson was obtained: a free Web site.31 Anyone who wants to 
check the full context of the words quoted can easily do so. The easy 
access to Johnson's words arises because of-not despite-their pub-
lic domain status. Admittedly, public domain status does not inevi-
tably encourage dissemination. Just as some works will be dissemi-
nated more easily if they are in the public domain,32 it is conceivable 
that other works will be disseminated more easily if the publisher or 
restorer can purchase an exclusive license. 33 My estimate is that an 
overly broad tool such as copyright extension will result in more 
negative effects than positive effects on noncreative dissemination 
·activity.34 However, even if a term extension were to generate more 
noncreative dissemination 'than would a shorter term, that increase 
would be outweighed by loss to creativity. 
31. http://newark.rutgers.edu/-jlynch/Texts/BLJ/bljSO.html. 
32. Boswell's Life of Johnson is an example. See supra note 26. 
33. For examples of the different situations that can be faced by persons 
desiring to disseminate old works, compare, e.g., Brief for the Respondent at 
34, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent], with, 
e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 18-23, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618, and Hal 
Roach Brief, supra note 18, at 1-3. 
34. Where the copyright owner cannot be located, or where many copyright 
owners' consent would be necessary, the high transaction costs may prevent 
dissemination. In such a case, public domain status eliminates transaction 
costs and makes dissemination more likely. Since digitization is often an inex-
pensive proposition, eliminating transaction costs and license fees will often be 
sufficient to allow persons such as plaintiffs to anticipate a net benefit from 
engaging in dissemination. In other situations, it may be easy to find and ob-
tain a license from the copyright holder, but expensive to restore or digitize the 
work. In such a case, where transaction costs are low but production costs are 
high, dissemination may happen anyway, since there are many ways to take 
advantage of one's effort without copyright, such as lead time. See, e.g., 
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in 
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 299 
( 1970). Nevertheless, it is conceivable that in some subgroup of the latter class 
of cases, dissemination would be furthered by having a long copyright term, so 
that the restorer or digitizer can purchase an exclusive license. To determine 
what kinds of situations are more likely to occur, and what kinds of works and 
modes of dissemination are differentially affected, is an empirical question. 
More importantly, given the very different nature of the problems faced by the 
two classes of cases, the broad brush of copyright extension-which gives 
roughly a century of exclusivity to all works-is a particularly inappropriate 
tool. 
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II. PUBLIC GOODS: THE FRAMERS PERCEIVED AUTHORIAL ACTIVITY 
AS DIFFERENT 
At the time of the Framers, publishers and restorers of old works 
were engaged in an enterprise whose costs followed the usual pat-
terns of tangible manufacturing. 35 Each company had to bear its own 
manufacturing costs. If a Pennsylvania newspaper set the day's sto-
ries in type, a New York newspaper could not copy without incurring 
its own costs to set the same stories in its own type.36 The typeset-
ting was not a "public good." There was no way for the second 
newspaper to free ride on the physical labor of the first typesetter to 
print the document. 
Admittedly, some non-authorial activity in the eighteenth cen-
tury did produce things that were both related to the growth of 
knowledge and susceptible to copying. The primary example is the 
non-creative directory. However, the existence of such directories is 
hardly authority for the proposition that the Framers may have 
wanted to use the Copyright Clause to assist all culturally relevant 
"public goods." To the contrary, the Supreme Court has held that 
non-creative directories, despite their "public goods" character, lie 
outside the borders ofthe Clause.37 
The primary economic goal of copyright is to provide incentives 
that would otherwise be lacking.38 For physical goods, ordinary, 
non-monopolistic competition provides adequate incentives for pro-
duction. Ordinary competition also provides a low price to 
consumers. For the physical aspects of typesetting, then, a monopoly 
would have raised costs without providing any societal benefit. En-
couraging the physical aspects of typesetting was in no way part of 
the Framers' goals. It is only when publishers stood in authors' 
35. See EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 17 
(2000) (describing how early printing presses were laborious to use and show-
ing the requirement of typesetting). 
36. /d. 
37. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
38. See Demsetz, supra note 2 and accompanying text. Some commenta-
tors argue that intellectual property also serves to centralize control in a useful 
way. See Edmund W. Kitch, Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 
J .L. & ECON. 265 ( 1977). However, I do not see evidence of this concern in 
the Framers' debates. Moreover, the centralization argument has little force 
when applied to copyright, a field whose merit is diversity rather than centrali-
zation. See Economists' Brief, supra note 25 at 12-15. 
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shoes (as licensees and assignees of authors, or as authors themselves 
when they made creative compilations) that publishers bore costs for 
something that could be copied. Only then-having obligations to 
pay independent authors or creative employees-would publishers 
have an investment that might raise their costs higher than a copier's, 
and only then did they have a conceivable need for copyright protec-
tion. 
In the Statute of Anne, England abandoned the pre-copyright 
practice of giving monopolies to publishers as publishers, and our 
Constitution and statutes followed suit.39 In giving copyright only to 
"authors,"40 the implicit plan was this: To encourage the writers by a 
monopoly and to encourage the publishers by the ordinary economic 
system operating through the legal regime of tangible property and 
contract. Once copyright helped the writers, at least in the eighteenth 
century, the disseminators could take care of themselves. 
This is in fact how the legal system operated. When copyright 
was given to authors rather than publishers in England's Statute of 
Anne41 and in our own country's initial copyright statute,42 it came 
with a warning that in future, noncreative disseminators could have a 
39. See L. Ray Patterson, The DMCA: A Modem Version of the Licensing 
Act of 1662 (June 28, 2002) (unpublished draft on file with author). 
40. Publishers can still hold copyrights, of course, but they have to do so as 
authors (if they themselves do creative work), or as assignees or employers of 
authors. My concern is with publishers who seek to own copyright on account 
of noncreative activity. On publishers' role in the early history of copyright, 
see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF 
COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 37-43 (1994); see 
also BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT (1967). 
Admittedly, publishing entities did much of the lobbying that led to copyright, 
see GOLDSTEIN, supra, and continue to influence legislation. Jessica D. Lit-
man, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
857, 870-82 (1987); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Informa-
tion Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19 (1996). But the identity of the lobbyists who push 
for legislation is hardly detenninative of how the legislation is to be inter-
preted. In all legislation, much lobbying is done by people who stand to gain 
monetarily. Nevertheless, they seek to persuade by pointing to the benefit the 
public will reap, and it is in tenns of public rather than private benefit that the 
legislation is worded and interpreted. 
41. See An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 21 
(Eng.) ("An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by vesting the Copies of 
printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies during the Times 
therein mentioned."). 
42. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § I, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802). 
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right to exclude only by purchasing or licensing an author's copy-
right.43 It was that payment to the author-the investment in creativ-
ity-that copyright law sheltered. The copyright law shielded the 
publisher who had paid something to the author, from competition by 
the publisher who had paid nothing to the author.44 It did not aim to 
protect one publisher's physical investment from competition by an-
other publisher who made a similar physical investment of his own.45 
In fact, the Framers were quite worried that a monopoly unre-
lated to creativity would result from the Copyright and Patent 
Clause. They deliberately drafted the Clause to avoid this and re-
lated dangers. 46 
While a monopoly over physical processes was unnecessary in 
the Framers' day, changing technology has now made it possible for 
copiers to take a free ride on some products of physical effort. The 
newspaper that puts words in print can be photocopied. An old 
movie broadcast on television can be duplicated at less cost than the 
film stock may have taken to restore. Similarly, someone who 
spends great sums compiling data that he sells in CD-ROM form can 
find his data copied and resold.47 As a result, modem publishers 
43. See id. 
44. See id. 
45. See id. The distinction I am drawing is between noncreative physical 
activity and creative mental activity, not between publishers and authors per 
se. Admittedly, the line can blur between mental and physical activity, be-
cause virtually all physical activity by humans is organized by some kind of 
mental conception or intent. Regardless of the existence of activities on the 
boundary between the two, it is clear that the Framers were concerned with 
activity safely on the "mental" end of the continuum-authoring and inventing. 
A word should also be addressed to a class of activities that rest on the 
edge between physical and mental, namely, noncreative mental activities such 
as tabulating and compiling lists. Such activities involve relatively little mus-
cle, yet the worker spends more time moving fingers on pen or keyboard than 
she does thinking. These are known as "sweat of the brow" activities, a meta-
phor that inadvertently captures both the physical ("sweat") and mental 
("brow"). As noted, the Supreme Court in Feist decided that such products are 
not protectable under the Constitution's Copyright Clause. See Feist Publ'ns, 
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
46. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (describing how the Framers were guided by the Statute of Anne, 
which was designed to destroy the booksellers' monopoly of the booktrade ). 
47. The example is drawn from Pro-CO v Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (upholding shrinkwrap license prohibiting the copying of non-
copyrightable database). Unfortunately, that case dangerously and improperly 
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might claim that they, like authors, face a situation where their in-
vestments are open to dangerous free riding 48 because their products 
are "public goods": inexhaustible, and sometimes hard to fence off 
from users who have not paid for the privilege of use.49 Modem 
publishers thus might argue that without some form of copyright pro-
tection, they will not optimally invest in collecting, typesetting, or 
film restoration, which may be easily and cheaply duplicated. Such 
an argument was apparently made on behalf of the CTEA.50 
The argument has many theoretical and empirical flaws from an 
economic perspective. Before returning to the historical question of 
the Framers' perspective, let me discuss some of those economic ar-
guments. 
The producer of a "public good" has the best claim to need legal 
protection from copying when certain conditions appear. These con-
ditions-what one might call prisoner's dilemma 
suggests that mass-market shrinkwrap and click-through contracts should be 
enforceable to restrain copying. Such contracts-including their ability to fos-
ter price discrimination-are the functional equivalents to copyright. See 
Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications 
for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998). Congress, rather than private 
dictate, should adjust the applicable policies, and mass market contracts re-
straining the copying of non-creative literary works should be pre-empted. !d. 
48. As will appear in the discussion immediately below, see notes 50-54 
and accompanying text, free riding is likely to be dangerous only in limited 
situations that give rise to "prisoner's dilemma." See Wendy Gordon & Robert 
Bone, Copyright, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 189-223 
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); Wendy J. Gordon, On 
Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 
VA. L. REV. 149 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, On Owning Information]; Wendy 
J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual 
Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 853, 853-69, 871-81 (1992) [hereinafter 
Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure]. 
49. For a further definition of public goods, see supra, note 13 and accom-
panying text. 
In the early stages of writing on the economics of copyright, it was easy to 
overstate the dangers of underproduction supposedly faced by public goods. 
For an example of my own possible over-enthusiasm, see Gordon, Fair Use as 
Market Failure supra note 13 at 1610-11; see also Demsetz, supra note 2, at 
306 (suggesting that when nonpurchasers cannot be excluded from using a 
public good at a reasonable cost, a system of private production "does not 
seem to be practical"). 
50. See supra note 17 (quoting from Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 379 
(D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
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conditions51-include the simultaneous occurrence of high initial 
investment, lack of lead-time advantage, cheap and quick copying, 
absence of nonmonetary rewards, and perfect substitutability be-
tween the original product and the copy.5 When one or more of the 
conditions are absent, creative or industrious effort can earn signifi-
cant revenues even without a legal prohibition on copying. For all of 
these to appear simultaneously--or even for a significant number of 
51. A "prisoner's dilemma" is a situation where parties seeking their own 
self-interest will probably be unable to achieve the desired benefits for them-
selves without some mode of coordination. A mode of coordination, such as 
contract, morality, or copyright law, changes the payoffs to non-cooperative 
behavior and generates higher results for the group. See Gordon, Asymmetric 
Market Failure, supra note 48, at 859-68. 
52. Only if seven core conditions are present would a prisoner's dilemma 
exist whose payoff structure actively discourages independent creation. These 
conditions are: 
( 1) The cost of independent creation or production is very high. 
(2) A second party is able to copy the creation/production from its origi-
nator at a cost lower than the cost of independent creation, and no other 
restraint (e.g., a sense of fair play) adds significantly to the copier's rea-
sons for refraining from making copies. 
(3) These copies are perfect substitutes for the originator's product, be-
ing identical to the originator's product in regard to all characteristics that 
affect consumer preferences. Such characteristics include, inter alia: 
quality, reliability, number and quality of distribution networks, authen-
ticity and associational value, and support services provided in connec-
tion with the product. 
(4) Consumers perceive the two products to be perfect substitutes. (Ar-
guably, ifthis condition is met, it does not matter if the copies indeed are 
perfect substitutes.) The originator cannot rely on lead-time advantage, 
willingness to provide support services, or brand loyalty to distinguish his 
goods from the imitators' goods. 
(5) The difference between the cost of copying and the cost of independ-
ent creation is high enough that the price the copyist charges will be sig-
nificantly less than the price the originator would have to charge in order 
to recoup his costs of independent creation. 
(6) In the absence of an opportunity to recoup the costs of independent 
creation, no one will invest in creative activity. That is, nonmonetary 
remuneration (such as prestige or the desire for artistic satisfaction) plays 
no role in inducing the originator's creation or production. 
(7) The independent creator or producer can recoup her costs only by 
means of selling or licensing copies, and in doing so, she has no effective 
recourse to price discrimination. 
The above list closely follows that in Gordon & Bone, supra note 48, at 199-
200, where a fuller discussion of prisoner's dilemma can be found. 
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them to appear at the same time-is fairly rare. 53 To grant a monop-
oly where a monopoly is unnecessary simply raises prices, and re-
duces access. By definition, free riding is beneficial;54 it is only in 
special circumstances that it can impose costs as well. 
Aside from the constitutional text, then, there can be significant 
reasons to avoid giving publishers legal protection against free riding 
unless the protection is sufficiently narrowly drawn. Public goods 
are everywhere, 55 and the inexhaustibility they promise is something 
to be savored. The inexhaustible benefits from public goods should 
be made scarce if that is the only way incentives can be 
provided-and often there exists a wealth of other institutional alter-
natives for providing incentives. The very fact that public goods are 
everywhere is testament to the fact that explicit legal protection is 
not always required for them to come into being. 
To this should be added the way that the CTEA will aggravate 
many transaction cost and anticommons problems. This has been 
well addressed by others. 56 
Although the overall effect that the CTEA would have on even 
noncreative activity is highly likely to be negative, from a legal 
53. The examples collected in Breyer, supra note 34, at 323-50, are illumi-
nating. Also see, e.g., Bjorn Frank, On an Art Without Copyright, 49 
KYKLOS 3 (1996), reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 49-61 (Peter Dra-
hos ed., 1999); Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law 
and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLIN£ L.REv. 261 ( 1989). 
54. Free riding always produces a benefit, namely, the "ride" provided to 
the person who makes use of the product. See, e.g., KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED 
VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2, supra note 40 (learning is a form of free riding). 
To free ride is to benefit without paying. Even for tangible goods, free rid-
ing may not cause harm: to benefit from my apple, you may gaze at its beauty 
(not harmful) as well as take a bite out of it (harmful). That is because every 
physical good has a tangible as well as an intangible aspect. 
Harm is even less likely when a stranger benefits from a good that is de-
fined as an inexhaustible intangible: no matter how many times a song or pho-
tograph or text is copied, the original remains intact. The possibility of harm-
less free riding also applies to the "new" public goods such as copyable type-
setting. 
55. Consider any product launch. In many ways it is a "public good" sub-
ject to some prisoner's dilemma characteristics: Product launches can be im-
mensely expensive and risky to undertake. If successful, the new product will 
be imitated, and competitors who did not need to bear the initiator's launch 
costs can price their substitute more cheaply. Nevertheless, product launches 
continue. 
56. See supra note 18 and sources cited therein. 
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perspective the most interesting question arises by assuming the op-
posite for the sake of argument: that the CTEA might have a net 
beneficial effect on noncreative restoration and publication. So let us 
assume arguendo that a significant number of restorers and publish-
ers would need the CTEA' s extra twenty years of protection against 
copying if they are to have incentive to engage in an optimal amount 
of noncreative activity.57 Let us also assume arguendo that the 
CTEA could improve the incentives for this noncreative activity 
more than it would impair the noncreative activities of other potential 
restorers and publishers. Finally, let us also assume arguendo that 
American institutions could tolerate giving a property-right form of 
monopoly to resolve this assumed paucity of incentives. 58 If this 
were the state of the world, could Congress constitutionally use 
copyright to provide noncreative laborers protection against those 
who would free ride on their physical effort? 
This is similar to the very question faced in Feist, and the Court 
answered "No."59 An entity that had collected a series of names and 
telephone numbers sought to use copyright to prevent the data from 
being copied.60 The Supreme Court struck down the plaintiffs copy-
right on the ground that no creative selection or arrangement had 
gone into the compilation-and that both the statute and the Consti-
tution required such creativity as a precondition for protection.61 
Conceivably, the Court in deciding Eldred could turn away from 
the direction indicated by Feist and could decide that the Copyright 
57. That means we are assuming arguendo that many persons in their role 
as noncreative disseminators and restorers own copyrights or could obtain li-
censes on copyrighted material, and that extending the term on those copy-
rights will enable the disseminators and restorers to avoid a prisoner's di-
lemma. 
58. Copyright gives a set of entitlements that is much broader than the pro-
tections against free riding that our common-law traditions would otherwise 
justify. See Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 48, at 159-197 (argu-
ing, inter alia, that nothing broader than a fact-sensitive unfair competition 
tort, and not a property right, should be allowed for noncreative works). 
59. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
60. See id. at 341. 
61. See id. at 346. In Feist the noncreative laborer sought a copyright for 
its own work product, see id. at 373, while under the CTEA, Congress protects 
the noncreative laborer by means of extending the copyright in someone else's 
creative product. In Eldred, the proponents of the CTEA have made much of 
the fact that Feist is distinguishable. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 
33, at 21-23. The distinction is there, but it is more formal than substantive. 
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Clause is a warrant for protecting any industry that both furthers the 
"Progress of Science"62 and faces a public goods and prisoner's di-
lemma problem. Such an odd and dangerous result is conceivable 
because the Framers, not having faced the issue of physical effort 
that was susceptible to free riding, left no black letter dictate one way 
or the other. My point, therefore, is not that the Constitution explic-
itly prohibits Congress from "promot[ing] Progress" by fostering 
monopolies on physical processes. Rather, I suggest that for the 
Court to find that Congress could promote "Progress" in this way, 
the Court would be taking a step away from its previous understand-
ings63 and from the Framers' own conceptions of the Clause. 
Further, should the Court take such a step, it would be allowing 
Congress to manipulate copyright and patent for the purpose of aid-
ing any industry that has a plausible claim to promoting Progress. 
Few industries cannot make such a claim. A host of new special in-
terests would enter the lobbying fray as against the interests of the 
creative and of the public. 
Where does this leave us? If the Court wishes to hold steady in 
the direction chosen by Feist, and avoid opening the copyright and 
patent laws to further distortion, the Court should either hold that 
weight should be placed only on the statute's effects on creativity, or 
it should hold that under the Copyright Clause the legislation's ef-
fects on creativity should be weighed more strongly than the legisla-
tion's effects on noncreative dissemination-much as a given ingot 
of gold far outweighs a silver ingot of equal volume.64 
In my view, the CTEA does not even provide a significant 
amount of "silver" (noncreative activity), primarily because term ex-
tension makes it harder to disseminate many works. Therefore, what 
we are really trading for the gold of creativity is not silver but merely 
dross. 
62. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
63. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 340. 
64. By labeling creativity "gold" and the noncreative dissemination "sil-
ver," I do not mean to be claiming that new works are more valuable than old. 
I am not even making a factual claim as to whether creating new works or re-
storing the old contributes more to "Progress." Rather, I am suggesting that 
given the purposes of copyright, when assessing a change in the copyright re-
gime one must give more weight to incentives to be creative than to incentives 
to preserve, restore, and mechanically disseminate works. 
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Ill. BENEFITS AND COSTS TO THE CREATIVE 
This Section has several parts. In the first, I will show the neg-
ligible positive effect that the retrospective extension is likely to have 
on creative persons. In the second, I will make vivid some of the 
nonmonetary burdens that any term extension will impose on the 
creative. In the third, I will show that the CTEA's retrospective ex-
tension only provides meaningful incentives to the noncreative. If 
this is so, the nation in adhering to the CTEA is at best giving up new 
authorship (gold) in order to obtain increased noncreative labor (sil-
ver). In adopting the CTEA, Congress intentionally or unintention-
ally seeks increased dissemination at the cost of a decrease in crea-
tivity. 
A. Retrospective Term Extension: Positive Effect on Creative 
Persons? 
The defenders of the CTEA have made an argument that extend-
ing the copyright term in already-existing works gives incentives to 
authors to generate new works.65 The argument depends on the fol-
lowing set of propositions, all of which (except the first) are far-
fetched, yet all of which must be true before the term extension of 
already-existing copyrights could have any impact on the creation of 
new works. The argument fails. Here are its necessary components: 
(1) A significant number of authors on a significant number of 
occasions are encouraged to create new works by the prospect 
of their heirs receiving royalties, or by the prospect of receiving 
a current payment that reflects a more than trivially long term of 
copyright. 66 
(2) A significant number of authors will be significantly less 
encouraged by a term of copyright that extends fifty years after 
65. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 33, at 31. 
66. See id. at 26 n.l7. The arguments here can easily be restated in terms of 
work-for-hire. For works-for-hire, the copyright owner may be a corporation 
who has no heirs of the body, but if an extended term is likely to be valuable to 
someone, that value--discounted to the present--<:ould raise the current value 
of the hiring party's copyright. See the numeric example, infra at Part III.B. 
The numeric example was crafted to make the term that the non-employee au-
thor would expect to receive match the work-for-hire term. 
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their death than they would be by a copyright that extends sev-
enty years after their death. 67 
(3) The rewards promised by the life-plus-50-year term, which 
Congress made effective in 1978, had by the time of the CTEA 
been eroded by technological or other changes. 68 Authors today 
perceive the erosion and believe that such reduction of profit 
will continue. 69 
(4) Authors see the CTEA's grant of an extra twenty years to al-
ready-existing copyrights as a compensatory response to the 
purported decrease in profit stream since 1978.70 
(5) The discouragement that a current author would otherwise 
feel in facing the prospect of a reduction in profit because of 
technological change could be significantly reduced by a prom-
ise of further extending the copyright term. 71 
(6) In giving an extra twenty years post mortem to works al-
ready created, the CTEA will assure current authors that they 
can put energy into creating new works without fear that the 
"value" of the term currently granted will be eroded. 72 This is 
because: 
(7) Authors will interpret the CTEA's retrospective term exten-
sion as a sort of guarantee that Congress will continue to extend 
copyright retrospectively, to terms beyond life-plus-70, if tech-
nology or other factors make copyrights less profitable to ex-
ploit.73 
(8) Authors will respond to this perceived guarantee by creating 
more and better works today than they would have created 
without the perceived guarantee. 74 
In sum, this set of propositions argues that authors currently ex-
ist who would fear to create because they worry that something could 
happen in, say, year 2030 to make their works less profitable. It 
67. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 33, at 26-27 & n. 17. 
68. See id. at 26-27. 
69. See id. at 25-27. 
70. See id. at 21. 
71. See id. at 26-27. 
72. See id. at 28-32. 
73. Supporters of the CTEA make a similarly far-fetched argument regard-
ing increases in life span creating a need for longer copyright. See id. at 22-23. 
74. See id. at 30-34. 
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further assumes the CTEA retrospective term extension relieves such 
authors of fear because it assures the authors that Congress will re-
spond to market changes in, say, year 2030, by retrospectively ex-
tending the life-plus-seventy term again, perhaps to life-plus-ninety. 
Then it argues that the promise of such a further extension suffices to 
bring otherwise fearful artists back to the drawing-board and writers 
back to their word processors. 
How do the eight propositions comport with the facts? Viewed 
objectively, only proposition (1) fares well. Even if the facts are 
viewed most favorably to the position of the CTEA proponents, cru-
cial steps in the argument still fail to achieve plausibility. 
Argument (1) is probably true for a significant number of au-
thors. As for argument (2), authors' responsiveness to copyright in-
centives has its limits. Not only do authors have many sources of 
incentives other than copyright, 75 but in addition, the bulk of a 
work's return-if the work is successful-ordinarily comes in the 
first few years after publication, with a sharp decrease in receipts 
over time. Copyright in the far-distant future usually will involve a 
minor or nil amount of money, even if not discounted to present 
value. Moreover, even if significant revenue were expected to come 
in the far distant future, its present value is low. 76 Argument (2) is 
thus not well founded. 
Regarding argument (3), it is far from clear that erosion has oc-
curred. Although private copying has increased via the internet, so 
have opportunities to profit through new media, and so has legal pro-
tection. Copyright has steadily grown stronger, both internationally 
and in the United States.77 For example, through the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, Congress has given copyright owners immense 
75. The classic work on this topic is by Justice Stephen Breyer. See 
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, supra note 34; see also Stephen 
Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1972). See also, e.g., 
Palmer, supra note 53, and Frank, supra note 53. One of the modes of obtain-
ing revenue without copyright is to price discriminate. Libraries who have 
been largely freed of the threat of copyright infringement when they make pho-
tocopies, pay a sub silentio licensing fee because the journals charge the librar-
ies subscription rates that are much higher than those charged to individuals. 
S. J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, 8 
RES. L. & ECON. 181 (1986). The article is available at 
http:/ /wwwpub.utdallas.edul~liebowitlknowledge _goods/rle/rle 1986.html. 
76. On discounting to present value, see infra Part III.B. 
77. See Vaver, supra note 30, at 624-27. 
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powers in the form of governmental rights to back up the owners' 
technologies of self-help.78 Nevertheless, since some copyright 
owners may well perceive erosion (whether or not it is present), we 
should continue through the list. 
Regarding argument ( 4 ), might some authors perceive the CTEA 
as a response to private copying? It is possible. Might these authors 
think they can rely on the CTEA as a guarantee of future Congres-
sional response (argument 7)? This is highly doubtful. No one ex-
pects that a current Congress can bind a future one, particularly when 
no explicit promises are made. Nevertheless, let us resolve argument 
(7) arguendo in favor of CTEA proponents, and assume that some 
authors interpret the CTEA's retrospective grant as such a guarantee. 
That brings us to the crux: Could such a CTEA "guarantee" 
give something sufficiently substantial today that potential creators 
and investors who feel threatened will instead feel safe? Here we are 
squarely in giggle territory. If an immensely cautious potential au-
thor feared a reduction in profit in 2030, it is hard to see that extend-
ing the term of something already unprofitable would be a reassuring 
response. More importantly, if an extension from life-plus-fifty to 
life-plus-seventy has remarkably little present value, a contingent 
promise of an extension from life-plus-seventy to life-plus-ninety 
would have even less. 
As will be demonstrated below, it is hard to imagine anyone be-
ing affected by the prospect of an income stream being increased or 
decreased fifty-one years after he or she has died. In the numerical 
example that follows, I try to make this more concrete. 79 It is harder 
still to imagine that this ultra-sensitive person who receives a life-
plus-seventy-year copyright under the CTEA will be encouraged to 
work harder because she thinks that her new works may in the future 
receive a term that is longer yet. 80 
78. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103, 112 
Stat. 2860, 2863-76 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000)); see 
also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS 
IN A CONNECTED WORLD 249-61 (2001) (arguing that technology coupled with 
law has given copyright owners large amounts of control not previously avail-
able to them). 
79. See the discussion in the numerical example, infra at Part Ili.B., for 
discussion of discounting. 
80. In Lord Macaulay's words: 
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B. Numerical Example: Potential Raw Benefit of Term Extension 
To illustrate the small present value of extending life-plus-fifty 
to life-plus-seventy, let us give the CTEA proponents the benefit of 
the factual doubt, and do a calculation that is fairly generous to their 
assumptions. Let us assume, contrary to likely fact, that an authors' 
works will bring a constant, rather than decreasing, amount of in-
come every year it is on the market, and examine what the present 
value of that income stream might be. 
What follows is an examination of how an author as a reason-
able economic person would perceive such a stream of income po-
tentially available in the future. The process involves mathemati-
cally discounting the future benefits to present value. 81 What the 
We all know how faintly we are affected by the prospect of very dis-
tant advantages, even when they are advantages which we may rea-
sonably hope that we shall ourselves enjoy. But an advantage that is 
to be enjoyed more than half a century after we are dead, by some-
body, we know not by whom, perhaps by somebody unborn, by some-
body utterly unconnected with us, is really no motive at all to action. 
Macaulay Speech of 1841, supra note 4, at 200. 
81. The expectation that authors will discount to present value is a com-
mon-sense part of the explanation of why copyright terms should be limited 
rather than perpetual. Interestingly, however, a long copyright term can pro-
duce a net loss for society even if authors are indifferent as between immediate 
and future rewards. Economist Stan Liebowitz has developed a fascinating 
illustration to this effect. He shows that under some assumptions, copyright 
could produce a net social loss even if authors did not respond less favorably to 
distant rewards than to immediate ones. E-mail from Stan Liebowitz, Profes-
sor of Managerial Economics, University of Texas at Dallas (Autumn 2002) 
(on file with author). Incidentally, although I make use of Professor Lie-
bowitz's illustration with his permission, I subject it to uses of my own, and 
responsibility for any errors rest with me. 
In the illustration, all works are assumed to last for ten years. Without 
copyright, the value of a work to society is assumed to be $100 per year. Un-
der copyright, since the price is higher and fewer copies are disseminated, the 
value of the work to society is assumed to be $60 per year. Assume that with-
out copyright 100 copies will be produced. The copyright term can be from 
zero to ten years long, and for every year of copyright that the law promises, 
authors are assumed to respond by bringing forth six additional works. 
Although the assumptions are quite constraining, most of us will neverthe-
less be surprised by the result: less value is generated under a nine or ten year 
copyright term than under no copyright at all. On the following graphs, the 
duration of the copyright term is measured (in years) on the horizontal axis. 
The vertical axis measures the monetary value of the works created under each 
designated copyright term. The first chart measures the gross output of works: 
the value of works under no copyright, and the value of works under copyright 
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terms of from one to ten years. The second chart shows how these various 
copyrights compare with a regime of no copyright at all. In a sense, the second 
chart measures the monetary value, under the assumed facts, of the various 
copyright systems. 
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The following examples will illustrate the method of calculation. Note 
that discounting plays no role, nor are administrative costs of the copyright 
system included. 
Under no copyright: With zero copyright, 100 works are produced which 
are worth $100 yearly and last ten years. Their value over the ten years (with-
out discounting) is thus$100,000. 
Under a regime giving one year of copyright protection: With one year of 
copyright, six more works are produced, totaling 106 works. The first year of 
these works' existence is under copyright, so each generates $60 in value 
($6,360 for all). The next nine years they are in the public domain, so, without 
discounting, over that period each of the 106 generate $900 ($95,400 for all). 
Summing the value during the ten years that the works last, the 106 works have 
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public reaps from copyright is the value of any new work induced 
into existence by the author's perception of present value, minus the 
costs attributable to copyright. The current section addresses only 
the positive effects that could result from a term extension. It argues 
they are minor, if any. The net value of this particular copyright 
law-how any positive effects weigh against the extension's nega-
tive effects-is the subject of later sections. 
Let us imagine an author who anticipates that a writing of hers 
would bring her or her heirs $1 ,000 every year from the moment of 
creation until copyright ends. Assume the author is sixty in 2002, 
and that actuarial tables tell her she can expect to live another 
twenty-five years, to 2027.82 If in 2002 she were deciding whether to 
a value of$101,760. (This appears on the chart above). This is an increase of 
$1,760 over a system of no copyright. (This figure appears on the chart be-
low.) 
Under a regime giving nine years of copyright protection: With nine years 
of copyright protection promised, authors produce (9 x 6) or fifty-four more 
works than they would without copyright. Under a nine-year term, therefore, 
154 works would be in existence. For each of the nine years under copyright, 
they generate $60 each, for a total of $83,160. In their last year, the 154 gen-
erate $100 of value each, or $15,400 for all. The total value of the works pro-
duced under a regime of nine years of copyright protection is $98,560. The 
copyright system now has produced a loss as compared with a system of no 
copyright. 
With a ten-year term, the loss grows larger. Under a ten-year term, 160 
works would be in existence and would yield a total value of $96,000-a loss 
of $4,000 in comparison with the $100,000 generated with no copyright at all. 
What drives the social loss in the illustration is copyright's unitary term. 
CTEA proponents are not alone in assuming that extending a copyright term 
will sometimes bring forth more works. Such an assumption necessarily im-
plies that different works or classes of works (novels versus movies, perhaps) 
respond to different incentives. A unitary term by definition is unable to re-
spond to different works' needs with varying periods of protection. In a world 
where different works respond to different terms, a unitary term will therefore 
generate deadweight loss. 
82. The example in text is premised on a sixty-year-old author. A younger 
author would anticipate having a longer term. This "life plus" structure of the 
law is potentially counterproductive: as Macaulay argued, a term hinging on 
the life of the author gives the longest period of legal protection to ''juvenile" 
works, and the shortest period to "mature" works. Yet works "written in ma-
turity" tend to be more valuable. If it is thought necessary to give more incen-
tive, terms should be defined by a certain term, rather than by a "life plus" 
formula. See Macaulay Thomas Speech Before the House of Commons (Apr. 
6, 1842), in 8 THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 210-16 (Lady Trevelyan ed., 
1906). Also available at the website identified in footnote 4. 
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write a new book, under the pre-CTEA copyright law she would ex-
pect her copyright to expire in 2077. Assuming a five percent rate of 
interest and no inflation, and assuming that she values income to her 
heirs as highly as she values income to herself (unlikely, given that 
she may never meet some of them),83 the present value of this sev-
enty-five years of receiving $1000 yearly would be $19,490.84 She 
would, therefore, be willing to invest at least $!9,490 in time, 
money, and opportunity cost, in creating the work. (I say she would 
invest "at least" that amount, because there likely are intrinsic satis-
factions to the work, as well as nonmonetary advantages such as 
reputation that will increase the present value of the work to her 
above its potential for earning income.) 
Of that $19,490 in present value, $18,260 represents the present 
value of the first fifty years of income, and a mere $1,230 represents 
the present value attributable to the following twenty-five years of 
income. 85 (The sharp drop is easily explained: the more far away a 
piece of income is, the less its prospect is worth now.) In sum, under 
the pre-CTEA copyright law of "life plus fifty,"86 the sixty-year-old 
author's copyright will probabll7 expire in 2077, and the present 
value attributable to her doing the new book is $19,490. 
If the CTEA is upheld, another twenty years of income will go 
to her heirs. 88 What is the present value of the additional income 
stream, assuming that $1 ,000 continued to be earned every year be-
tween 2077 and 2097? It is $320, raising the 2002 present value 
from $19,490 to $19,810.89 That $320 is a very small sum compared 
to the whole and is likely to have small or zero marginal incentive 
effect, which is gained at the disproportionate expense of the 
83. See Macaulay Speech of 1841, supra note 4, at 200. 
84. Affidavit of Hal R. Varian para. 5-9, Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 99-5430) [hereinafter Varian Affidavit], available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/varian.pdf. 
85. See id. 
86. See id. 
87. I say "probably" because the longer the author lives, the longer her 
copyright term will be. The year of expiration in text is merely based on the 
hypothetical actuarial table stipulated above. 
88. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. I 05-298, 
§ 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U .S.C. §302 
(2000)). 
89. See Varian Affidavit at para. 5-9, Eldred (No. 99-5430). 
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public.90 (I will return to the issue of disproportion below.)91 Never-
theless, under the terms of my hypothetical, the CTEA would make 
the new book worth an additional $320 to the author. Conceivably, 
that prospect may add to her incentives. (Probably not, but con-
ceivably). But even so, how will she be persuaded to do new work 
by learning that not only her new work, but also existing works will 
gain the extra twenty years of protection? For our author to be per-
suaded to do new work by the retrospective increases, she would 
have to interpret that aspect of the CTEA as a promise that Congress 
will in the future retrospectively increase the term that her 2002 
works will have under the CTEA' s life plus seventy years, to a term 
that is still longer. Further, she would have to believe that such a 
promise, if fulfilled, would make a financial difference to her. 
Recall that adding the extra twenty years at a distance of life-
plus-fifty was worth only $320 in present value because of the many 
years that would pass between the author's decision to create (today) 
and the potential revenue (far in the future). By the same logic, ex-
tending the term again from life-plus-seventy to life-plus-ninety 
would have a present value far less than $320-and the present value 
of an extension to life-plus-ninety would need to be further reduced 
because of the inevitable risk that Congress could not fulfill the 
"promise." It is absurd too imagine therefore that a conditional 
"promise" to extend copyright beyond life-plus-seventy would make 
a difference to the author. 92 
90. See Liebowitz, supra note 75, at Figure 2 and accompanying explana-
tion. 
Macaulay argued that "[a] monopoly of sixty years produces twice as 
much evil as a monopoly of thirty years, and thrice as much evil as a monopoly 
of twenty years." Macaulay Speech of 1841, supra note 4, at 200. This is 
mathematically correct if by "evil" he meant the costs to the public without 
regard to the offsetting benefits that copyright also brings. Taking both into 
account, however, Macaulay underestimated. 
The offsetting benefits are higher, and the costs lower, in the first years of 
a monopoly than in its later years. The deadweight loss caused by increases in 
monopoly duration grows at a far faster rate than the incentive effect does. See 
Liebowitz, supra note 75, and my discussion of his thesis infra Part IV. A 
monopoly of sixty years imposes more than twice as much deadweight loss 
(exclusive of the impact of discounting) as does a monopoly of thirty years. 
91. See infra Part IV. 
92. See supra Part III.A. (the implausible and many-part argument that 
seeks to portray the CTEA as part of a promise-keeping or reputation-
enhancing move by Congress). Compare this with the immediate incentive 
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It is also important to note an internal inconsistency. To argue 
as the proponents of the CTEA do, that authors should expect that 
Congress will give such further extensions,93 assumes what CTEA 
advocates usually try to deny: that unless cabined by the instant 
case, copyrights will continually increase in duration in the future. 
C. Restraining the Creativity of New Generations of Authors 
Increasing a copyright's term increases the costs of new crea-
tion.94 We noted that our hypothetical creator's copyright would 
have expired, under pre-CTEA law, in 2077.95 A young creator in 
2078 may be inspired, irritated, or frankly captured by our creator's 
2002 work. 
He may have no road except that road. As one artist has said: 
Creative people are prisoners. That is to say that they get "capti-
vated," and the only way out is to beat a path away from the 
point of captivity. If my attention is "captured," it is impossible 
to simply get away. The bars are not physical. They are pro-
duced by the intellectual, the emotional, or, more usually, a com-
bination of the two. But, they are as functional as any jail cell 
you will ever construct in the material world .... 96 
The key to the cell is permission to use the artifact that has so 
captured the artist. Unfortunately, sometimes licenses will not be 
granted. As Lord Macaulay argued: 
I seriously fear that, if such a measure as this [copyright ex-
tension] should be adopted, many valuable works will be ei-
ther totally suppressed or grievously mutilated . . . . bT]hat 
the danger is not chimerical may easily be shown .... 7 
effect of giving federal copyright to existing works upon publication, which 
was the Jaw prior to 1978. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
93. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 33 at 30-34. 
94. See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 361-63. 
95. See supra Part III.B. 
96. J.S.G. Boggs, Who Owns This?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 889 (1993). For 
further examples, see Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression, supra note 
2,at 1567-73. 
97. Macaulay Speech of 1841, supra note 4, at 204. 
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One of the most instructive, interesting, and delightful 
books in our language is Boswell's Life of Johnson.98 Now 
it is well known that Boswell's eldest son considered this 
book, considered the whole relation of Boswell to Johnson, 
as a blot in the escutcheon of the family. He thought, not 
perhaps altogether without reason, that his father had 
exhibited himself in a ludicrous and degrading light. And 
thus he became so sore and irritable that at last he could not 
bear to hear the life of Johnson mentioned. Suppose that 
the law had been what my honorable and learned friend 
wishes to make it. Suppose that the copyright of Boswell's 
Life of Johnson had belonged, as it well might, during sixty 
years, to Boswell's eldest son. What would have been the 
consequence? An unadulterated copy of the finest bio-
graphical work in the world would have been as scarce as 
the first edition of Camden's Britannia.99 
A prominent modem example of copyright being used as an in-
strument of suppression involves Margaret Mitchell's saga of the 
South, Gone With the Wind. The Mitchell estate denied permission 
for a realistic version of Gone With the Wind, insisting (among other 
things~ that interracial sexual relations be banished from any se-
quel.1 ° Alice Randall wrote a parodic sequel, The Wind Done Gone, 
without the permission of the copyright owner. Seeking to examine 
the world-view of Gone With the Wind and heal some of the hurts 
that book caused, Randall made her central character interracial: the 
daughter born from the union of Mammy (an African-American 
slave) and Mammy's owner (a white man, Scarlett's father). The 
Mitchell estate, unsurprisingly, sued Randall. Initially the estate was 
successful. Sale of The Wind Done Gone was enjoined. 101 
Randall would not have been sued if the copyright in Gone With 
the Wind had not been extended. Yes, Randall wrote the book de-
spite the CTEA, and might have been awarded fair use treatment 
98. Boswell's biography is the source ofthe material from Johnson quoted 
earlier, supra note 26. 
99. Macaulay Speech of 1841, supra note 4, at 206. 
100. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282 (11th 
Cir. 2001). 
101. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 
(N.D. Ga. 2001), rev 'd, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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eventually. 102 Nevertheless, no one can deny that the extension of 
copyright in Margaret Mitchell's book drastically increased the cost 
of Alice Randall's book (and she was rare in having a publisher will-
ing to bear extensive legal costs). Alice Randall is the prototype of 
the creative copier who should be encouraged. 
Not all persons similarly situated will be as courageous (or as 
lucky) as Randall was. The fragility of speech is well 
known-iconoclasts may be silent if their target icons are both well 
funded and entitled to sue. 
There is a moral and constitutional aspect here as well. The cure 
for bad speech is more speech. 103 Predecessor authors should not be 
entitled to harm us and then use copyright to prevent us from having 
redress. 104 
In a recent interview, Randall made clear that Gone With the 
Wind had injured her and many other African-Americans. Although 
as a young girl Randall loved Gone with the Wind, as an adult she 
came to realize she would have been better off never having read the 
book-she says now that if blindness would have enabled her to 
avoid reading it, she would rather have been "born blind". 105 
Psychologists tell us that not only must we speak of our traumas 
to decrease their hold over us, but also that being required to keep 
silent inflicts an additional trauma. 106 It may not be sufficient to 
102. The case settled. For its history, see SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mif-
flin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001), rev'd, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th 
Cir. 2001). 
103. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) ("[T]he remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."). 
104. See generally Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression, supra note 
2. 
105. See the "Connection" website for July 16, 2001 with guest Alice Ran-
dall talking about her book, THE WIND DONE GONE (200 1 ), at 
http://www. theconnection.org/archive/200 1/07 /0716b.shtml. 
106. See, e.g., ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD: HIDDEN CRUELTY IN 
CHILD-REARING AND THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE (Hildegarde & Hunter Hannum 
trans., 2001 ): 
It is not the suffering caused by frustration ... that leads to emotional 
illness but rather the fact that the child is forbidden by the parents to 
experience and articulate this suffering, the pain at being wounded ... 
Children are not allowed to reproach their gods-their parents and 
teachers. 
!d. at 252. 
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write about those traumas in order to exorcise them: one may need 
to relive and rewrite them. The process of aesthetic growth may re-
quire recasting the works that for good or ill have shaped an artist's 
inner life. In the words of Harold Bloom, the serious work of a poet 
begins with his "creative misprision" of the works that came be-
fore.107 One must work through one's predecessors-both in the 
sense of reading and interpreting, and sometimes in the sense of 
speaking in their forms, using their tropes or settings or 
characters-sometimes finding one's own voice only by listening to 
how it alters the telling of a known story. 
Like all of us, artists often have little choice about what is mean-
ingful to them; if the road is blocked, expression is blocked. 108 Some 
of the blockage that copyright imposes may be tolerated as neces-
sary-but the CTEA's virtual century of exclusivity is not necessary. 
What is lost is more than the individual artist's ability to find his or 
her voice, for artists are spokespersons as well: they serve their au-
diences as well as themselves. 109 
It is difficult to speak of what makes an author. Lewis Hyde in 
his evocative book, The Gift, suggests that an important part of the 
process is the living relation between the artist and what he re-
ceives.110 The beauty of the physical world and the life within 
predecessor artists' work create in the receiving artist a sense of 
gratitude. The artist repays the gift by his own creation-so that 
gratitude becomes a catalyst (or better, a nutrient fluid) fostering new 
creativity. Hyde points out at least two things that can interfere with 
[I]t is not the trauma itself that is the source of illness but the uncon-
scious, repressed, hopeless despair over not being allowed to give ex-
pression to what one has suffered .... 
/d. at 259 
107. See HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF 
POETRY (1973). 
108. See Boggs, supra note 96. 
109. As a college student, I found the Air Pirates' satires of Disney charac-
ters exhilarating and, in a subtle way, freeing. When Disney sued, the Air Pi-
rates parodies were enjoined as copyright infringements, and taken off the 
shelves. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978). For 
more about the Air Pirates, see Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression, 
supra note 2, at 1602-04. 
110. See LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF 
PROPERTY, at xi-xvii (1979). By "erotic," Hyde is referring primarily to emo-
tional rather than physical connections among persons. 
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this necessary gratitude: monetary payment, and a sense of calcula-
tion.111 
In my mind, the danger lies less in a need to pay, than in a need 
to calculate. Imagine a composer inspired by a book that she read as 
a child to make an opera of it. Can you imagine her genuine impulse 
of creativity surviving the calculating process? Calculating the li-
cense cost; comparing the cost of that license with the license to use 
other books; manufacturing an inspiration to match whatever book 
bore a license fee she can afford ... that is not the way that many of 
our best creative people operate. Those whose motivation is 
intrinsic1 12 are not free to calculate, to search for the cheapest license 
or the author's heir who doesn't object to being reinterpreted and 
criticized. 
Many copyrighted works may be produced solely for money. 
Nevertheless, everyday experience and psychological research both 
suggest that as a society we benefit most from those works produced 
by persons whose aesthetic is internally driven. 113 Today's artists 
need money to live on, of course, as did their predecessors. But at 
some point, the lever that extracts payment discourages the later au-
thor much more than it feeds the earlier. 
D. Why the Positive Effects, If Any, Affect Noncreative More Than 
Creative Activity 
Exclusivity can both create and destroy economic value. 1 14 
When exclusivity is profitable, only noncreative copiers need to ob-
tain it by piggybacking on a long-dead author's copyright. 
111. See id. at chs. 3, 8. 
112. Theresa Amabile and other social psychologists have determined that, 
in many instances, external motivation in the form of rewards can increase the 
quantity of creative work, but is likely to decrease its quality. Intrinsic motiva-
tion tends to produce better work. See TERESA M. AMABILE, ET AL., 
CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT: UPDATE TO THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
CREATIVITY ( 1996). 
113. Id. (by implication). 
114. At one extreme is the tragic commons, where loss of value can be 
remedied by (inter alia) instituting exclusivity. At the other extreme is the 
tragic anticommons, where loss of value can be remedied by (inter alia) giving 
common privileges of use. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3, and sources 
cited therein. 
In regard to the CTEA, one can envisage several scenarios. In one, restor-
ing or digitizing an old work is very expensive, and a prisoner's dilemma 
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By contrast, the creative person who translates or adapts or ar-
ranges something in the public domain gets her own copyright, and 
starts a new copyright term running. 115 She does not need to license 
from a prior generation copyright owner in order to obtain exclusiv-
ity; she has it as of her own right. Therefore, the translator, trans-
muter, or other creative copier cannot benefit from an extended 
copyright in pre-existing works, except by the attenuated and im-
plausible argument sketched above. 116 
Thus, the instant retrospective term extension can at best in-
crease the amount of noncreative copies in the world. Creative users 
of past works do not need extensions of copyright term in order to 
have protection against copying, for their work starts copyright 
anew. fi7 
If this term extension encourages anyone, therefore, it encour-
ages the noncreative. In the process it makes things more difficult 
for the creative author, such as Alice Randall, who wants to address 
her culture's iconic works by inhabiting their shells and showing au-
diences their unexpected dimensions and hidden rooms. To favor the 
uncreative over the creative turns copyright on its head. 
IV. THE ECONOMISTS' BRIEF 
An amicus brief filed by several prominent economists suggests 
that the CTEA is not economically desirable. 118 Their brief, while 
excellent, could have been even stronger. Because the brief chooses 
exists that makes it risky for anyone to engage in the restoration or digitization 
unless he or she can obtain protection against copying. In another, restoring or 
digitizing an old work is inexpensive, or a labor of love, or can expect to reap 
monetary rewards without need of copyright. In a third, tangled questions of 
ownership prevent any restoration of an old work until it enters the public do-
main. The question of whether CTEA helps or hurts the noncreative depends 
on which scenarios predominate. 
115. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). See Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, 
Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 782 (2d. Cir. 1994) (derivative work is copyrightable if it is 
sufficiently original). 
116. See discussion supra Part III.A. (the implausible and many-part argu-
ment that seeks to portray the CTEA as part of a promise-keeping or reputa-
tion-enhancing move by Congress). 
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 103; see also, 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.07[C] (2002). 
118. See generally Economists' Brief, supra note 25 (where seventeen 
economists contributed to the brief discussing the economics of the CTEA). 
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not to discuss what Demsetz called the "Nirvana Fallacy,"119 the 
brief fails to show how as the duration of copyright increases, the 
costs that copyright imposes increase disproportionately in relation to 
its benefits. This Article briefly suggests how the economic presen-
tation could be fleshed out. 
A threshold issue needs first to be disposed of: the proper lo-
cus for comparing social cost and social benefit. A casual reader of 
the Economists' Brief might think that the economists mean to com-
pare "the additional cost of term extension" with "the additional 
compensation for creating new works."120 However, the social bene-
fit with which the brief is ultimately concerned is not the "additional 
compensation."121 The potential social benefit of a term extension is, 
rather, what the additional compensation may call forth for society: 
an increase in the quantity or quality of works 122 over what would 
have been produced under a shorter term. 
This clarification may help resolve a confusion that occasionally 
arises. Commentators sometimes criticize the standard argument for 
119. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 
J.L. & ECON. I, 1-4 (1969) (discussing Nirvana Fallacy). 
120. Indeed, the two are linked in seeming parallel. See Economists' Brief, 
supra note 25, at II. 
121. Admittedly, one could construct a social welfare function in which the 
copyright owners' revenues (independent of incentives) constitutes a social 
benefit. However, this is neither what the brief intended, see Economists' 
Brief, supra note 25, at I 0 ("benefits, in the fonn of additional incentives to 
create"), nor is this a social welfare function that ordinary economic analyses 
of copyright would invoke. 
The pursuit of justice is also a social benefit, of course, albeit one not eas-
ily measured. Would the added compensation (independent of incentives) 
serve justice? I doubt it. Even to someone like me, who is convinced of the 
justice of some copyright as an institution, the long tenn of the CTEA exceeds 
most plausible claims of justice-based entitlement. See Jane C. Ginsburg, 
Wendy J. Gordon, Arthur R. Miller, & William F. Patry, The Constitutionality 
of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long? 18 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 651, 674-686 (2000) (speech of W. Gordon). Thus, while I have ar-
gued that creators have some claim to reward independent of incentives, 
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into The Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of 
Consistency, Consent and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 
(1989), when I examined creators' justice claims in more depth I concluded 
that the claims, though real, were quite limited. See Gordon, A Property Right 
in Self-Expression, supra note 2; Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 
48. 
122. See Economists' Brief, supra note 25, at 10 ("benefits, in the fonn of 
additional incentives to create"). 
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limited duration on the ground that it seems to compare (1) future 
royalties discounted to present value with (2) undiscounted future 
deadweight costs. Since future gains and losses should ordinarily be 
treated the same way--either both discounted, or both not dis-
counted-this criticism would be powerful if it accurately described 
the economic basis for limited duration. But the criticism misde-
scribes its target. 
Future royalties are not what the standard argument for limited 
duration places on the "benefits" side of the scale. What it places on 
the scale is the value of new or improved works brought forth. This 
value is in turn treated the same way as are the deadweight costs. 
Perhaps the confusion arises because authors themselves indeed 
discount as part of their calculations. When deciding whether to get 
out of bed in the morning, a potential author will be tempted less by 
long-distant rewards than by immediate ones. But economists focus 
on what this discounting perception produces: not the authors' per-
ception of reward but the works the authors produce in response to it. 
Copyright's contribution to the work's coming into being is weighed 
in the same way as copyright's contribution to societal cost. Thus, 
the standard economic argument for limiting copyright's duration 
does treat gains and losses symmetrically. 123 
It is also worth clarifying the nature of the social cost imposed 
by term extension. As the preceding section of the Article makes 
clear, this cost is not solely monetary. 124 For both audiences and 
creators, the cost is one of experience. Audiences have less access to 
their culture if monopoly keeps the price of copies high, and term 
extension will also make it harder for young authors to make new 
works-particularly works that reshafe the cultural reality the au-
thors themselves have experienced. 12 The works foregone may be 
123. For example, one can do the computation with no discounting on either 
side: comparing the undiscounted future deadweight costs with the similarly 
undiscounted value of new works bought forth by the copyright monopoly. 
In addition, one could restate the standard case in a way that dispenses 
with the language of "deadweight loss" altogether. One could simply compare 
cultural output under different states of the world: a world with no copyright, a 
world with perpetual copyright, and worlds with durations in between. This is 
the method illustrated by the graph and mathematical example in note 81supra. 
124. See supra section III.C. 
125. See Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93 (1992) (suggesting that just as early man drew pic-
tures of the beasts, wood and water around him, contemporary artists must-to 
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commercial and trivial, or heartfelt and culturally crucial: the "social 
cost" of copyright extension includes both. 
Now let us turn to the Nirvana Fallacy and systematic dispropor-
tion between cost and benefit that arises as copyright term extends. 
In assessing the costs associated with the copyright monopoly, 
many analysts compare the price and number of copies that "could 
have been made" under perfect competition, with the price and num-
ber of copies under the partial monopoly of copyright. They use the 
label "deadweight loss" to identify the social benefit that could have 
been achieved if copies had been available at a competitive price, a 
benefit which is "lost" under copyright. However, for items that 
need the copyright monopoly to come into existence, there is no level 
of competitive price and quantity with which to compare. To believe 
otherwise would mean believing in a Nirvana where, impossibly, 
pure competition coexists with works that need monopoly to come 
into existence. 
Therefore, in assessing the social cost of intellectual property, 
one should not consider it a social cost that a work called forth by the 
monopoly is sold by its owner at a price higher than the owner could 
have demanded in a perfectly competitive world. When then do 
"deadweight losses" arise? They arise when there is extra copyright 
protection beyond what is needed to call forth the work. The dead-
weight loss that should count is that attributable to extra amounts of 
protection-amounts of protection that stifle speech without creating 
new speech. 
At first blush, this insight might seem to aid the proponents of 
the CTEA, since the argument suggests that deadweight losses are 
overstated in many conventional analyses. 126 However, as Stanley 
Liebowitz has shown, the insight has an even more powerful impli-
cation: that the cost of monopoly increases at a far faster rate than 
capture and deal with their environment-depict what surrounds and influ-
ences them, including artifacts that others have made); Gordon, A Property 
Right, supra note 2, (arguing that under natural law, a new generation of artists 
should have a right equal to that of their predecessors to recreate and transform 
their environment, even iftoday's environment is largely man-made). 
126. It would indeed be an error to count all copyrighted works as generating 
deadweight loss. Similarly, one should not assume that a lack of copyright 
would yield pure competition. Without copyright, factors such as lead time 
advantage and potential for retaliation would provide some monopoly profits. 
Cf, Breyer, supra note 34. 
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the incentive effect does. 127 Taking into account only the loss attrib-
utable to unnecessary copyright protection makes it easier to see the 
costs of long copyright terms. Every year of added duration brings 
additions to the group of works as to which copyright generates 
deadweight loss, 128 and subtractions from the group as to which 
copyright provides a social benefit. 
To see that, let us backtrack to basics. Different creative works 
require different incentives. Some works would have come into be-
ing without any copyright at all; some would have come into being 
with a promise of five years of copyright protection; some would 
have come into being with a promise of ten years of protection; and 
so on. Only when a work would have come into existence without 
the need of a particular monopoly provision, should that provision be 
counted as generating a deadweight loss. This applies to provisions 
about duration as well. Every year that copyright lasts, more and 
more works fall into the category of works that did not need a copy-
right term this long to be produced. 
Consider, for example, a copyright duration of five years. As-
sume there is a work for which the author needed the full five-year 
term to be induced to produce the work. Let us assume the work in 
question is an interpretive translation of Beowul/ 29 called "Beowulf 
Transmuted." For "Beowulf Transmuted," a five-year copyright term 
generates no loss: if the book is valuable, its value is a gain attribut-
able to that five-year copyright. 130 However high in price and small 
in quantity the copies of "Beowulf Transmuted'' might be, they are a 
pure gain compared to an alternative state of shorter copyright in 
which this version of Beowulf did not exist. This is not true as to 
works that would have come into being with a term of less than five 
years: for a work that needed only three years of copyright to come 
into being, a five-year term generates two years of deadweight loss. 
127. See Liebowitz, supra note 75 at Figure 2 and accompanying explana-
tion. 
128. !d. In this and succeeding paragraphs of the instant section, my analysis 
is heavily indebted to that of Liebowitz. 
129. BEOWULF (Michael Alexander ed., 1995). 
130. The work's existence is also attributable to many other contributing 
causes, such as the translator's efforts, dictionaries she may have employed, 
and, of course, the sources of the first Beowulf. When I speak of the work's 
being "attributable to" copyright, I mean only that copyright is one of its many 
causes-in-fact. 
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What happens in year six? I have already stipulated that the au-
thor of "Beowulf Transmuted'' would have written it so long as she 
anticipated copyright protection would last five years. If copyright 
ended at five years, in year six the book would be in existence, and 
could be reproduced and sold competitively. Per-copy price would 
go down and the quantity in circulation would rise. 
By contrast, if copyright continued in the sixth year, the book 
would be sold at a higher price to fewer people. Under copyright, it 
would thus generate less benefit than it could in the absence of copy-
right. The decrease is "deadweight loss" attributable to the extra 
year of protection. In assessing the value of a sixth year of copy-
right, then, an economist would put "Beowulf Transmuted'' into the 
category of works for which copyright generates a loss-although 
for the fifth year of the copyright's duration, the book had belonged 
in the category of works for which copyright generated a social bene-
fit.l31 
Every year, more and more works make the transition from the 
plus to the minus category. The same book for which copyright gen-
erated no deadweight loss in year Y (because its author needed as in-
centive a copyright whose term continued through that year), may 
generate deadweight loss the next year. Should the Court uphold the 
term of "life plus seventy," every book and film that would have 
come into existence even without the extra twenty years falls into the 
category of contributing to deadweight loss. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In assessing the constitutionality of copyright legislation, this 
Article suggests the Supreme Court should weigh effects on creative 
activity more heavily than effects on noncreative physical activity. 
The CTEA retrospective extension of copyright term has at best the 
potential for giving inducements to noncreative physical activities. 
At the same time, the extension will impose strong restraints, many 
of whose negative effects will be felt by creative activities. More-
over, the negative effects grow larger the longer duration extends. If 
copyright is the "engine of free expression,"132 then the CTEA's 
131. See the mathematical example and charts supra note 81 for an illustra-
tion of the mechanism. 
132. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 
(1985). 
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retrospective term extension is an engine that is broken: it burns oil 
and drives us nowhere. 
Should the Court accept the differential weighing of creative 
mental activities and noncreative physical activities, the Court would 
not need a precise and detailed empirical examination to determine 
the unacceptability of the CTEA retrospective extension. Being gen-
erous to the CTEA's proponents and assuming arguendo that the ret-
rospective extension could induce more preservation and dissemina-
tion than it restrains, the best that could result from that extension is 
an increase in noncreative activity (silver) at the cost of creative ac-
tivity (gold). Given the great difference in density that gold and sil-
ver have, someone holding a nugget of each metal does not require a 
mechanical scale in order to determine which nugget is heavier and 
more valuable. 
Also, remember that it is only by giving substantial deference to 
Congress that one can assume even arguendo that the retrospective 
extension could produce silver at all. It is far more likely that the 
retrospective grant will restrain more preservation and dissemination 
than it generates-producing not silver but dross. Dross does not 
belong on the measuring scale at all. 
